IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MEGAN E. M.,

Plaintiff,

٧.

Civil Action No. 5:24-CV-335 (DEP)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

<u>APPEARANCES</u>: <u>OF COUNSEL</u>:

FOR PLAINTIFF

COLLINS, HASSELER & SIMSER LAW, PLLC 222 State Street Carthage, NY 13619

LAWRENCE D. HASSELER, ESQ.

FOR DEFENDANT

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN.
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21235

VERNON NORWOOD, ESQ.

DAVID E. PEEBLES U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ORDER

Currently pending before the court in this action, in which plaintiff seeks judicial review of an adverse administrative determination by the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"), pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

1 age 2 of 10

§§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings.¹ Oral argument was heard in connection with those motions on April 24, 2025, during a telephone conference conducted on the record. At the close of argument, I issued a bench decision in which, after applying the requisite deferential review standard, I found that the Commissioner's determination resulted from the application of proper legal principles and is supported by substantial evidence, providing further detail regarding my reasoning and addressing the specific issues raised by the plaintiff in this appeal.

After due deliberation, and based upon the court's oral bench decision, which has been transcribed, is attached to this order, and is incorporated herein by reference, it is hereby

ORDERED, as follows:

- Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED.
 - 2) The Commissioner's determination that the plaintiff was not

This matter, which is before me on consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), has been treated in accordance with the procedures set forth in General Order No. 18. Under that General Order, once issue has been joined, an action such as this is considered procedurally as if cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings had been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

disabled at the relevant times, and thus is not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act, is AFFIRMED.

3) The clerk is respectfully directed to enter judgment, based upon this determination, DISMISSING plaintiff's complaint in its entirety.

David E. Peebles U.S. Magistrate Judge

Dated: May 5, 2025

Syracuse, NY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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MEGAN M.,

Plaintiff,

-v- 5:24-CV-335

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

DECISION TRANSCRIPT BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID E. PEEBLES

April 24, 2025 100 South Clinton Street, Syracuse, NY 13261

For the Plaintiff:

COLLINS & HASSELER, PLLC 225 State Street Carthage, New York 13619 BY: LAWRENCE D. HASSELER, ESQ.

For the Defendant:

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 26 Federal Plaza Room 3904
New York, New York 10278
BY: VERNON NORWOOD, ESQ.

Hannah F. Cavanaugh, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR
Official United States Court Reporter
100 South Clinton Street
Syracuse, New York 13261-7367
(315) 234-8545

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               (The Court and all parties present by telephone.
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    Time noted: 1:20 p.m.)
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               THE COURT: I have before me a challenge to a
    determination by the Acting Commissioner of Social Security
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    finding that the plaintiff was not disabled at the relevant
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    times and therefore ineligible for the benefits which she
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    sought. The challenge is brought pursuant to 42, United States
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    Code, Sections 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).
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               Before I address the merits, I wanted to broach the
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    subject of consent. When this case was originally filed, it was
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    assigned to Magistrate Judge Daniel J. Stewart and the consent
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    form that was signed on behalf of the plaintiff on March 11,
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    2024, and filed at Docket No. 4 specifically consents to the
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    jurisdiction of Judge Stewart.
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               Attorney Hasseler, do you consent to my jurisdiction
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    to hear and determine this case?
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               MR. HASSELER: Yes, I do, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
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               The background of this case is as follows: Plaintiff
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    was born in May of 2001. She is 5'2" in height and weighs
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    approximately 200 pounds. She lives in Dexter, New York with
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    her boyfriend. Plaintiff has a high school diploma.
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    evidence is equivocal as to whether she attended regular
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    classes, which is indicated on her function report or special
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    education classes resulting in a special education diploma,
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MEGAN M. v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

which she testified to at page 56. She tried to attend

Jefferson County Community College and did so for a couple

weeks, but was unable to continue. She does not currently drive

due to anxiety, but she has a driver's learners permit and hopes

to get a license and a car, that she testified to at page 64.

Plaintiff suffers from some physical impairments, but

they do not appear to be at issue in this case. Specifically,

at page 78 of the Administrative Transcript during the hearing

in this matter, she testified that she is physically healthy.

Mentally, she suffers from major depressive disorder,

anxiety disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, personality

Mentally, she suffers from major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, personality disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder or PTSD, also, alcohol use disorder, and marijuana use disorder. She testified that she's a daily user of marijuana. All or some of her problems appear to stem from physical abuse that she suffered at the hands of her father who was an alcoholic. She testified that she experiences frequent panic attacks, anxiety. There's some history of suicidal ideation and there is an indication that there may have been a suicide attempt back in 2013 and/or 2014.

In terms of work, plaintiff has done volunteer and part-time work at the Dexter Free Library where her boyfriend's mother is the director, that's Kimberly Weston, who gave a statement in this case.

Activities of daily living for the plaintiff include the ability to prepare meals. She does chores, including

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cleaning, laundry. She goes grocery shopping, takes walks,
watches television, plays video games. She is or has been in a
softball league. She played softball in high school and at
least as of August 20th, that's at page 737 of the
Administrative Transcript, was on a softball team.
          She has also taken a trip to New York City to go to a
New York Yankees game and stayed overnight, a trip to Florida
where she flew and stayed for some period of time in December of
      She has helped her grandmother raise her brother in 2017
and 2020. She testified she has two close friends and she helps
in the kitchen of the local American Legion one to two times per
week.
          Procedurally, plaintiff applied for Title XVI
benefits on August 25, 2021. At page 223, she alleged
disability based on major depressive disorder, OCD, borderline
personality disorder, separation anxiety, and social anxiety.
          A hearing was conducted on March 9, 2022, by
Administrative Law Judge Jennifer Gale Smith to address
plaintiff's application. Judge Smith issued an adverse
determination on April 5, 2023. That became a final
determination of the agency on February 28, 2024, when the
Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied
plaintiff's application for review. This action was commenced
on March 8, 2024, and is timely.
          In her decision, ALJ Smith applied the familiar
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MEGAN M. v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

five-step test for determining disability. She found at step one plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the date of filing of her application. She did note that the plaintiff had some work experience part-time at the library.

At step two, she concluded that plaintiff does suffer from severe impairments that impose more than minimal limitations on her ability to perform basic work functions, including major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, personality disorder, cannabis use disorder, alcohol use disorder, and PTSD.

At step three, she concluded that plaintiff's conditions do not meet or medically equal any of the listed presumptively disabling conditions set forth in the Commissioner's regulations, specifically considering listings 12.04, 12.06, and 12.15. After reviewing the available evidence in the record, the Administrative Law Judge next concluded that, notwithstanding her impairments, plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity, or RFC, to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels with the following nonexertional limitations: Claimant can understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions; claimant can use judgment to make simple work-related decisions; claimant should work in a job with occasional changes in the routine work setting; claimant cannot perform work requiring a specific production rate, such as an assembly line or perform work which requires hourly quotas; and

MEGAN M. v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

claimant should have occasional contact with coworkers and supervisors, and no contact with the public.

Applying that RFC at step four, the ALJ noted that plaintiff did not have any past relevant work experience and therefore proceeded at step five where, with the assistance of a vocational expert's testimony, the Administrative Law Judge determined that plaintiff can perform available work in the national economy, citing as representative positions those of packager-hand cleaner-industrial marker, and routing clerk.

As you know, the task of the Court in this case is limited to determining whether correct legal principles were applied and the resulting determination is supported by substantial evidence. The Second Circuit has, on many occasions, noted the deferential nature of this standard, including in Brault v. Social Security Administration Commissioner, 683 F.3d 443 from the Second Circuit, 2012, and more recently in Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4d 64 from the Second Circuit, 2022.

In this case, the plaintiff has raised three arguments. First, claiming that the residual functional capacity finding is not supported by substantial evidence, the primary focus being on plaintiff's alleged inability to meet the on task and attendance requirements of full-time competitive employment. Secondly, she challenges the evaluation of medical opinions in the record. And thirdly, she questions the

MEGAN M. v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Administrative Law Judge's evaluation of plaintiff's complaints concerning symptomology.

Two things to be noted at the outset, the relevant period in this case is August 25, 2021, to April 5, 2023, and, of course, it is plaintiff's burden to establish not only medically determinable impairments, but limitations associated with those that prevent her from performing basic work activity and full-time competitive employment.

Turning first to the argument regarding RFC, claimant's RFC represents a finding of the range of tasks the plaintiff is capable of performing notwithstanding the impairments at issue. Ordinarily, that represents a claimant's maximum ability to perform sustained work activities in an ordinary setting on a regular and continuing basis, meaning eight hours a day for five days a week or an equivalent schedule, Tankisi v. Commissioner of Social Security, 521 F. App'x 29, Second Circuit, 2013.

The RFC is typically informed by all of the evidence of record, including medical records, medical opinions, and other evidence. When assessing the RFC, an ALJ must include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports the ALJ's conclusions, citing medical and nonmedical evidence and facts.

The RFC in this case, which I read, is based on the evidence of record. And, significantly, one of the items is

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MEGAN M. v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

ability to interact, as well as the on task and ability to meet the attendance requirements. I'll note that when we're talking about plaintiff's inability to perform in the library where she volunteered and, also, later had some part-time employment, it appears that the anxiety that she experienced at the library was triggered wholly or in part by her interaction with the public. The RFC in this case is more restrictive and would not allow her to perform in that position because it calls for no public contact. When you look to the evidence in this case, the RFC is well supported. It is supported by the prior administrative medical findings of Dr. Juriga and Dr. Bhutwala, who found that plaintiff did not suffer from a severe mental impairment and, when evaluating the so-called B criteria, determined that plaintiff had no limitation on the ability to remember or apply information, a mild limitation on the ability to interact with others, a mild limitation on the ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace, and no limitation in the ability to manage oneself. It is also supported by the medical records. The medical source statement of a treating source, Nurse Practitioner Patricia Desjarlais, from March 8, 2023, indicates only mild limitation on the ability to make judgments on simple work-related decisions, no limitations in understanding and remembering simple instructions and carrying out simple instructions, and only mild limitation on the ability

MEGAN M. v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

to interact with the public, and does not assess the ability to interact with supervisors or coworkers, so it is not inconsistent with the RFC.

The social worker, Brieanna Lewis, has indicated that plaintiff's mental status is generally unremarkable. Social worker Pam Brower, another treating source, indicates that plaintiff socializes well. The activities of daily living from the evidence of the record also supports the RFC. It shows that plaintiff can groom, cook, do chores, grocery shop, socialize, including in the softball setting, her New York City trip that I mentioned, her Florida trip that I mentioned. She has two close friends with whom she socializes. She helped raise her brother. She attends regularly the American Legion and helps in the kitchen.

Dexter Public Library, her boyfriend's mother, Kimberly Weston.

It's page 300 and it's a to-whom-it-may-concern. It shows that plaintiff struggles with anxiety and days when she would come in and cry because she was so anxious, and seven times she could not work her full shift because of her high anxiety level. And pertinently, it indicates Megan had to be encouraged to help patrons checking out books because she was not comfortable speaking to them. And as I indicated before, the RFC in this case alleviates that potential trigger by requiring no contact with the public, so I believe the RFC is adequately supported by

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substantial evidence and I do not find that a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.
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Turning to the evaluation of medical opinions, the new regulations which control in this case and took effect for applications filed after March 27, 2017, are specific. They do not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to medical opinions, but instead require consideration of several factors, including, significantly, supportability and consistency, 20 C.F.R. Section 416.920c(a). An ALJ must articulate in his or her determination as to how persuasive each of the medical opinions is found and explain why, and specifically focusing on supportability and consistency of those opinions. And I should say, although I don't think it comes into play here, to the extent that there are any conflicts in medical opinions, it is for the Administrative Law Judge to resolve those conflicts, Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578, from the Second Circuit, 2002.

In this case, Nurse Practitioner Makenzie Griffin gave somewhat of an opinion, if it can be called that, on August 12, 2021. That's at 947 of the record. Administrative Law Judge Smith analyzed it and found it not to be persuasive at page 24. As I indicated before, it first states that plaintiff meets the definition of disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Fair Housing Act, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. It does not speak to the standard for disability

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under the Social Security Act, and also speaks to a matter which
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    is reserved to the Commissioner of Social Security. It goes on
    to say that due to her emotional/mental disability, Megan has
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    certain limitations related to social interaction, et cetera.
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    It does not quantify those limitations and, as such, is
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    unhelpful. The letter also speaks to and advocates for a
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    support animal and additional living space, but does not speak
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    to work functions and, in my view, does not meet the definition
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    of a medical opinion, which is set forth in 20 C.F.R. Section
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    416.913.
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               There's also, and I spoke to it earlier, the opinion
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    of Nurse Practitioner Patricia Desjarlais. It appears at 956 to
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    958 of the Administrative Transcript from March 8, 2023, and I
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    indicated what it said. It was found to be partially
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    persuasive, but the Administrative Law Judge actually found that
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    plaintiff is more limited than what was stated here. It clearly
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    only speaks to interaction with the public and not with
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    supervisors and coworkers, but the record supports that
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    plaintiff has only mild limitations in those areas as found in
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    the RFC, so that error, in my view, if it was indeed an error,
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    is harmless.
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               Then there are two prior administrative medical
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    findings from Dr. Juriga, November 30, 2021, at 84 to 92, and
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    Dr. Bhutwala from April 12, 2022, at 94 to 104.
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    Administrative Law Judge found those partially persuasive, but
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found that plaintiff was more limited. The Administrative Law
Judge could have done a slightly better job at explaining her
view of the supportability and consistency, but based on a
searching review of the record, I don't find any error and
believe that the correct standard was applied, Camille v.
Colvin, 652 F. App'x 25 from the Second Circuit, 2016.
          I note that prior administrative medical findings
like those in this case can provide substantial evidence if they
are supported by the record, Valdes-Osacio v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL
3573761, from the Northern District of New York, May 22, 2023.
          There's, I suppose, an argument to be made that
perhaps these are somewhat stale, the last one coming from
April 12, 2022. However, as the Second Circuit indicated at
footnote four in the Camille case, which I cited a moment ago,
unless there is evidence of significant deterioration, which I
didn't find in this case, they can supply substantial evidence.
          The last statement is from Kimberly Weston, undated,
at page 300. We just discussed it. The Administrative Law
Judge determined at page 24 it is not persuasive and the
reasoning was explained. I find no error. This was someone who
was related to plaintiff's boyfriend, it is not a medical
opinion, it is based primarily on plaintiff's subjective
statements. Ms. Weston has no medical training and it's really
not very illuminating concerning plaintiff's work limitations.
          The third argument raised has to do with the
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evaluation of plaintiff's symptoms. And under Social Security
    Ruling 16-3p, when assessing alleged symptoms, the
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    Administrative Law Judge must take into consideration certain
    objective evidence and record evidence and evaluate the
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    intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptomology
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    by considering various relevant factors. The Administrative Law
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    Judge in this case went through and cited evidence that she
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    relied upon. She summarized what her analysis was at page 22 to
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    24. And an Administrative Law Judge's assessment of plaintiff's
    individual subjective complaints is entitled to considerable
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    deference, Aponte v. Secretary Department of Health and Human
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    Services of U.S., 728 F.2d 588, Second Circuit 1984, and Shari
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    L. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 561563 from the Northern District of New
    York, February 24, 2022.
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               And what the ALJ relied on were medical records,
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    prior administrative medical findings, Nurse Desjarlais's
    medical source statement, her part-time work at the public
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    library. And as an aside, I have to say I went through
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    carefully plaintiff's medical records, including specifically at
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    6F, 9F, 10F, and 13F, and while there are certainly a few
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    isolated indications of bad days and so forth, a majority of
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    those show very little mental health symptoms. Page 758 from
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    June 8, 2021, anxiety bad, but plaintiff gets to softball
    parties and had a friend over. Page 759 from June 29, 2021, up
    and down, busy with friends and softball. At page 840 from
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February 10, 2022, better week, less symptoms, volunteers two
    times per week, spending time with friends, attending high
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    school basketball games. December 21, 2022, 927/928, enjoyed
    trip to Florida and flight.
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               So the vast majority of the medical entries are
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    supportive of the Administrative Law Judge's determination, so I
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    find that the residual functional capacity is supported by
    substantial evidence, as is the evaluation of reported symptoms,
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    medical opinions were properly evaluated, and the resulting
    determination in this case is therefore supported by substantial
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    evidence and results from a proper legal analysis, so I will
    grant judgment on the pleadings to the defendant and order
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    dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.
               Thank you, both. I hope you have a good afternoon.
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    Go out and enjoy this beautiful weather.
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               MR. HASSELER: Thank you, your Honor.
               MR. NORWOOD: Thank you.
               (Time noted: 2:47 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER I, HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR, Official U.S. Court Reporter, in and for the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, DO HEREBY CERTIFY that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United States Code, that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the stenographically reported proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and that the transcript page format is in conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Dated this 29th day of April, 2025. s/ Hannah F. Cavanaugh HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR Official U.S. Court Reporter